Abstract. This analysis re-instates the importance of the 1958 British intervention in Jordan within the study of Anglo-American relations and the revisionist literature on Suez. It does so by challenging the idea of British subservience to American foreign policy after the 1956 crisis, and it reveals two key lessons learnt by London: that Britain's economy, power, and influence were in decline and that Britain could no longer intervene in the Middle East without American support. Having learnt these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proved to be a shrewd political actor who used the opportunity of the Jordan intervention to turn the policy of the Dwight Eisenhower Administration to British ends, regaining Britain's maximum power and prestige for the minimum loss of resources. Early drafts of his memoirs also pejoratively referred to Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, as "inept" and "emotional and vindictive" over the events. However, Macmillan had learnt that he needed American support for the future. He noted the difficulty and importance of regaining the relationship in his memoirs:
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planning today: all British interventions in the Middle East should take place with American support. As Macmillan declared on the eve of the landings in Jordan "We would rather be wrong together than right separately". 16 Following the disastrous Suez affair, there was a great clamour to draw lessons from the events to inform the handling of crises in the future. Presumably, to avoid any investigation that may have revealed the Anglo-French-Israeli collusion over Suez, the government refused to hold any public or parliamentary committee-based lesson learning enquiries. 17 Official histories proposed by the Foreign Office and the suggestion of the publication of "Lessons Learned" reports by the Ministry of Defence were also vetoed. 18 Despite government protestation, some learning occurred within Whitehall evidenced through reflections recorded in reports, assessments, meeting minutes, conference notes, and despatches. 19 These included the "Lessons Learned" despatch prepared by the commanderin-chief of the Allied Forces during the Suez campaign, Sir Charles Keightley. In explaining the increasing importance of world opinion as a principle of war, he concluded that the actions of the United States prevented the British military from obtaining their objective. 20 For him, the key lesson to ensure future operational success was to work with the United
States:
This situation with the United States must at all costs be prevented from arising again.
Conversely a united Anglo-American position would have assured a complete success of all our political objects with the minimum military effort. The achievement of this is a political matter but the effects on military operations are vital. 21 
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The Chiefs of Staff circulated and discussed Keightley's report in detail. 22 Macmillan also read it; and he had a violent reaction to the Ministry of Defence proposal to publish the despatch. 23 At the same time, Sir Guy Millard, who served as both Eden and Macmillan's private secretary for foreign affairs, produced another lesson-learning document. 24 His paper focused on recording an account of the events of Suez from a British perspective and identifying some lessons for the future. It concluded: "For Britain, Suez was a climacteric. It had severely shaken the basis of Anglo-American relations and exposed the limitations of our strength. This fact defined the conditions within which British foreign policy must henceforth operate." 25 For Millard, there were two clear lessons for the future:
We could never again resort to military action, outside British territories, without at least American acquiescence. Our capacity to act independently had been seen to be closely circumscribed by economic weakness. The experience of Suez may have led to a re-assessment of British interests and of our relative position in the world. 26 These were strong but insightful words, which recognised the future importance of working with the Americans and a new understanding about Britain's position in the world, an awareness of which had begun to echo elsewhere in government.
Nine months earlier, Eden had offered similar reflections upon the lessons of Suez, which he had sent to the Foreign Office. At the end of five pages of manuscript notes, he concluded that Suez had forced a reassessment of Britain's place in the world and its international relationships. Eden wrote, "The conclusion of all this is surely that we must review our world position and our domestic capacity more searchingly in the light of the Suez experience, which has not so much changed our fortunes but revealed our realities". 27 
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The questioning of Britain's international position had also led the government's Foreign Affairs Steering Committee to reconsider "British Obligations Overseas". 28 The resulting paper, produced in April 1958, reported that Britain had two endeavours: first, to maintain world peace, order, and essential interests overseas and, second, improve Britain's economic position. There were five aims to achieve the first objective, two of which would become particularly relevant in the summer of the same year: "to maintain a large measure of identity between British and American interests" and "to maintain political conditions favourable to our trading requirements throughout the world, and especially in the Middle East."
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However, the paper also concluded that Britain had a number of problems in the Middle East that were proving challenging to obtaining favourable conditions including the rise of radical nationalism, the relic of colonialism, and a divergence of interests between
Britain and the oil producing and transit states. Furthermore, attacks on colonial, strategic, and commercial interests had become difficult to prevent as the cost of conquering and occupying a territory was no longer economically viable. The stark conclusion reached by the Committee was, "We are no longer in a position to 'go it alone'". 30 Instead, Britain's could only achieve its objectives by working with the Americans: "promoting United States involvement and the harmonisation of the Anglo-American policy".
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The Conservative Party had also reached the same conclusion. Department position paper for the conference stressed the importance of maintaining the British as a Middle Eastern ally with an aim to develop "mutually consistent policies". 39 At the conference, any discussion of Suez proved still to be too raw -Eisenhower noted in his memoirs that he and Dulles "found it difficult to talk constructively with our British colleagues about Suez because of blinding bitterness they felt". 40 Nonetheless, both Again, the Washington conference saw discussion of Middle Eastern issues where the prime minister sought further to institutionalise Anglo-American co-operation. 44 As a result, 10 several joint working groups emerged to produce co-ordinated planning and policy approaches. 45 For Macmillan, this process revealed a success in his efforts to a renewed relationship, and he declared to the Cabinet, "The prevailing mood in Washington had therefore been favourable to proposals for closer Anglo-American co-operation". 46 Caccia, "some of our people, not just in Washington but elsewhere, had the impression that we were being crowded by our British colleagues into intervention in Lebanon". 49 In fact, the Americans felt that they had to "cool down the British and their enthusiasm for immediate action", 50 Despite the contingency planning for intervention in Lebanon, and the previous British desire to push for a joint intervention in the country, there was concern amongst the Cabinet that a similar request from Jordan may not be far behind. There were also concerns over the security of Kuwait and question of whether intervention in Iraq was a possibilityall of which were areas where British interests were described as "paramount" in comparison to Lebanon. The Cabinet therefore concluded that although any action in response to the request had to occur as part of an Anglo-American plan, it was prudent to allow the Americans to take the lead in Lebanon with only "a small token British contribution". This action would achieve two objectives: visibility of a joint intervention whilst retaining sufficient troops to take the initiative elsewhere in the region. 56 However, Eisenhower had different ideas and opposed any participation by British troops, even a symbolic force. 57 Instead, he wanted to act unilaterally, setting aside previously discussed contingency plans to avoid the appearance of protecting colonial interests and negate the opportunity for the French to demand inclusion. As Macmillan noted in his memoirs, this time it was the Americans who would "go it alone": "This was indeed a 13 strange reversal of the situation only eighteen months before." 58 In fact, he declared that American actions were "a recantation -an act of penitence -unparalleled in history." 59 However, Suez tensions must have eased since Bermuda as when Eisenhower telephoned Downing Street to inform it of his decision, Macmillan joked, "You are doing a Suez on me". 60 Fortunately for the prime minister, another opportunity quickly presented itself.
Whilst Eisenhower was making his decision on Lebanon, a second request arrived from King
Hussein of Jordan for an assurance that he would also receive military support if required. 61 There had also been a contingency plan in place to support Jordan, "Operation Broil", and the Cabinet Defence Committee had begun to prepare urgent plans for sending troops to
Jordan as soon as the news of the Iraqi coup reached London. 62 The Committee preemptively considered the military implications of an intervention in Jordan the following day. 63 The Foreign Office received immediate instructions to begin working with the State Department to recommend wording to King Hussein for a formal appeal for military assistance should it be required. The aim was to ensure an appeal written satisfactorily to persuade both the public and the United Nations [UN] that any intervention was legitimate under international law, despite the lack of a UN resolution. 64 Macmillan also seized the opportunity and hawkishly asked Eisenhower what forces he would make available to any such request from the King Hussein and urged a commitment for a "joint intention". 65 Speaking to Eisenhower by telephone on 14 July -in a conversation where he repeatedly drew upon his personal relationship, referring to the president as "dear friend" three times -he emphasised, "we have got to see it together, dear friend" and "as long as I understand we are in this together. We are doing this together." 66 
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This emphasis was not lost on Eisenhower who noted in his memoirs, "He was anxious . . .
he wanted my assurances that we were in this together, all the way." 67 The replies from Washington were slow, which troubled Macmillan. Whilst
Eisenhower did not directly reply to Macmillan's telegrams, there were also concerns that
Dulles was hesitant about a Jordan mission. 68 In fact, this proved to be true; Dulles was sceptical about what could be achieved in Jordan, worrying that an intervention would weaken King Hussein's position in the long-term. 69 He also had suspicions about British motives as well as the necessity and desirability of the intervention. East than to find ourselves exposed and then abandoned". 72 As a result, according to notes taken from a meeting with the minister of defence and Chiefs of Staff on whether to provide military assistance to Jordan, the first consideration was "the reply from President
Eisenhower". 73 Macmillan immediately called a Cabinet meeting, which lasted three hours. During the course of the meeting, he phoned Dulles twice to gain support and confirm his position.
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Again the prime minister did not receive the answer for which he was hoping. In the first call, he consulted with Dulles over the British course of action and stressed the desire for 75 The American record of the conversation also states a request for providing support in the UN. 76 The response was reserved but positive.
The follow-up telegram from Lord Hood, minister at the Washington Embassy, confirmed that the Eisenhower Administration would not respond to the request from Hussein due to Congressional restraints, but it would provide a demonstration flight of aircraft over Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. In addition, Dulles agreed that if Britain did send troops, the action would have his support. 77 Following this reassurance, Macmillan advised King
Hussein about the granting of his request for military assistance. 78 He also felt the need to emphasise that this decision had occurred in consultation with the Americans. The Israelis had also learnt from Suez the importance of securing American support.
David Ben Gurion, the Israeli prime minister, advised the American ambassador that Israel would not grant the British permission for overflying until Washington gave assurances of aid to Israel if it became the subject of retaliation from other Powers. 81 At the same time as
Ben Gurion negotiated with the Americans, Brook was trying desperately to remedy the situation from London. Receiving no reply from Israel, he reached out to Washington and requested diplomatic support. 82 In a similar vein to Macmillan, Ben Gurion only conceded overflying approval after waking Dulles at 2:30 am to receive a personal reassurance of support. 83 Despite granting permission, Ben Gurion's actions were domestically unpopular and he soon came under heavy Soviet pressure to renege on the agreement. Two days after the start of the operation, Selwyn Lloyd reported that the Israelis were making overflying difficult and again put pressure on Washington for diplomatic assistance. 84 The next day
Macmillan received a message from the Israeli government to stop all overflying forthwith. 85 Although not amounting to a formal withdrawal of permission, it presented the British with a serious problem: there was no immediate alternative to overflying Israeli territory and the British forces at Amman were reliant on air transport for circa 100 tons a day of food, stores, and ammunition. 86 The solution, according to the Cabinet Defence Committee, was to convince the Americans to provide the entirety of the supply themselves, especially since they were successfully over-flying Israel to provide provisions to their own troops in
Lebanon. This would not only solve the problem at hand but would also result in engaging the Americans in the joint action that Macmillan had long since desired: "Equally, there would be great advantage in persuading the United States Government to accept the responsibility of organising the transport column from Aqaba to Amman and generally cooperating with us." 87 In fact, an early planning note passed to the deputy chief of staff had explicitly stated that this was an aim: "For political reasons we are anxious to involve the US in Jordan. As they may not agree to stationing troops we feel that they should participate in the airlift". 88 By 22 July, the situation had become more desperate as the Israelis reduced the permitted overflying time from 24 to nine hours a day. As a result, Macmillan again appealed directly to Eisenhower for support. He explained that the British troops in Jordan had only 12 days of food and oil supplies and only a few days of ammunition. He also reiterated the request put to Dulles for the Americans to take-over the airlift. 89 The next day Eisenhower agreed; United States Air Force Globemasters would take-over the provision of supply. 90 Macmillan had succeeded in his long held endeavour to secure a formal military relationship for the operation. Five days later Macmillan decided to try his personal touch to achieve the same objective. Stating fresh concerns about an impending coup, he appealed to Eisenhower from a military and political perspective: "I believe the essential thing is that you should send in some American troops to be alongside ours on the ground. Not only would this increase the military strength of the forces in Jordan, but it would have an extremely favourable political effect". 96 This missive arrived at the same time as a similar telegram from Amman. On 20
July, King Hussein had stated to the press that he had asked for, and expected, American troops. The next day his prime minister, Samir al-Rifai, called the American ambassador to appeal for the despatch of 2,500 to 3,000 troops to Jordan. He dwelt on the negative impact of having only British troops and advised of the public concerns of re-occupation by British forces and the rising calls for general strikes in protest and demands for withdrawal. 97 There followed the ambassador's approach to see Hussein the King who, supported by the British ambassador, reiterated the request for American ground troops and an added appeal for air power. 98 Whether a co-ordinated British-Jordanian endeavour manufactured these requests Suez Canal. 102 Macmillan also put in requests to Dulles for everything from the transport of drummed aviation fuel to maintenance of an airstrip and refrigerated containers. by Selwyn Lloyd to demonstrate a united Anglo-American operation and ensure not leaving
British troops over-exposed. 105 It also provided an existing forum for the British to develop further joint military planning used to consider on-going action in the wider Middle Eastern region after withdrawal. My great consolation is that we are together in these two operations in Lebanon and Jordan. We must at all costs not be divided now when we have been forced to play for such high stakes. I am sure that Foster and Selwyn will be able to work out together a joint plan for the future. 108 He ended by stressing "our close and intimate cooperation together". Selwyn Lloyd agreed and emphasised that "it is desperately important" for the United States and Britain to keep together on Lebanon and Jordan. 109 Macmillan also leveraged his relationship with Washington for diplomatic support in handling the UN and Russian responses to the intervention. 110 An informal working committee set-up within the British Embassy at Washington to coordinate issues specifically related to Jordan, including the UN negotiations, managed this liaison and negotiation. The committee met once a day and was described by Dulles as performing "an excellent job". Macmillan never achieved his ultimate ambition to make it a truly joint operation, he masterfully used the situation to his advantage and expanded American commitments of support as the operation progressed. Rather than demonstrating a subservient British foreign policy, the operation in Jordan revealed an active prime minister determined to use personal connexions and long-term allies for the benefit of Britain, pulling the strings of the Eisenhower Administration to achieve his own ends.
By the end of the campaign, it seemed as if Macmillan had managed a number of his objectives. He had proved to be a critical actor in returning the trans-Atlantic relationship to its pre-Suez state. Despite some initial tension, and lingering resentment and suspicions on both sides, the Anglo-American alliance exited the Jordan operation stronger than it has entered. 118 He also managed to negotiate a simultaneous rise of British prestige -through a 
